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Abstract 
In this study we build a simultaneous equation model in which the measures of different 
aspects of globalization (attributable to KOF) and different aspects of democracy 
(attributable to EIU) are related in seven structural equations. A bi-directional relationship 
between democracy and globalization is visualized. The model is estimated by the 
conventional 2-SLS as well as a modified 2-SLS in which Shapley value regression is used at 
the second stage of 2-SLS. On the basis of our analysis, we document several findings. First, 
we find that democracy and globalization promote each other and hence there is a bi-
directional causality with positive relationships running both ways between democracy and 
globalization. At a national level, there may be various intermediary conditions that modify 
the relationship as well as set in motion a complex of positive and/or negative feedbacks 
to accelerate or retard the pace of globalization and democratization in a country-specific 
manner. However, when a large number of countries are studied, a clear relationship 
emerges out. Second, there is a need to estimate the structural coefficients of the model 
cautiously since the regression equations may be suffering from collinearity among the 
predictor variables. The Shapley value regression based 2-SLS has performed better than 
the conventional regression in estimating the structural parameters of the model.  Third, 
the system methods of estimation of the model gives better results than what are obtained 
by the single equation methods of estimation of structural parameters of the model. 
Keywords:  Simultaneous equations model; Two-Stage Least Squares; Instrumental 
Variables; Collinearity; Shapley Value Regression; Democracy Index; Globalization Index. 
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1. Introduction 
The bearing of regime type (that has democracy and authoritarianism at two 
opposite poles) on globalization are debatable. On the one hand, there are 
research findings and arguments that suggest a positive influence of democratic 
attributes in governance on globalization, while, on the other hand, there are 
empirical studies as well as consorted line of reasoning that favours authoritarian 
elements in governance to promoting globalization. Reversing the arrow of 
causality, some scholars have given the logic along with empirical evidences that 
globalization promotes democracy while some others have reasons to contend 
that globalization hurts democracy.  Since a political regime has more pervasive, 
direct and explicit effects, the issue of impacts of globalization on democracy has 
elicited more attention of the scholars.   
Economists such as Schumpeter (1950), Lipset (1959), and Hayek (1960) 
argue that free trade and capital flows, by enhancing the efficiency of resource 
allocation lead to economic development which fosters demand for democracy. 
Schwartzman (1998) identifies class conflict as the social mechanism linking 
world-system processes to national political dynamics. In this framework, 
domestic political structures become part of the evolving transnational fabric of 
economic relations. Consequently, globalization promotes democracy at the 
national level which in turn facilitates further globalization in the interest of the 
dominant world economic system. 
Li and Reuveny (2003) study 127 countries for 26 years (1970-1996) and finds 
that different constituents of globalization affect democracy in different manner 
not conformal to each other. In their own words: “Trade openness and portfolio 
investment inflows negatively affect democracy. The effect of trade openness is 
constant over time while the negative effect of portfolio investment inflows 
strengthens. FDI inflows positively affect democracy, but the effect weakens over 
time. The spread of democratic ideas promotes democracy persistently over time.”  
Sobhan (2003) argues that the process of globalization represents involuntary 
and often extraneous constraints on the government and the people of a country. 
Countries with weak democratic institutions and undiversified or externally 
dependent economies fall prey to the globalization forces. Globalization may 
favourably help the economies that can diversify and where political institutions 
are strong enough to protect the interests of the citizens of different sections.  
Rudra (2005) covers 59 developing countries for the time period 1972-97 and 
finds that globalization does not directly and unconditionally promote democracy. 
Increasing exposure to international export and financial markets does lead to 
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improvements in democracy only if safety nets are used simultaneously as a 
strategy for providing stability and building political support.   
Eichengreen and Lebang (2006) analyses a long series of historical data 
(1870-2000) for a large number of countries and finds a bidirectional causality 
suggesting the existence of positive relationships running both ways between 
democracy and globalization. 
For Acemoglu and Robinson (2006a) the relationship between development 
and political regime is not a direct one. The political regime type shapes and is 
also shaped by economic conflict between elites and citizens. Political elites are 
unlikely to block development when there is a high degree of political competition 
or when they are highly entrenched. Expected political replacement effect has a 
direct bearing on the involvement of the elite class in a country in facilitating or 
discouraging globalization. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006b) also observe that key 
democratizing forces associated with trade openness depend on country’s relative 
factor endowment. 
Milner and Mukherjee (2009) studies 130 developing countries in the period 
1975-2002 distributed over different continents. It finds that democracy fosters 
trade and capital account liberalization, while the effect of economic openness on 
democracy is positive but weak. Neither trade nor capital account liberalization 
has any statistically significant effect on democratization.  
Turyahikayo (2014) examines the impact of globalization on domestic 
political structures and processes in established, transitional and non-democratic 
regimes. It reveals that globalization has been used as a tool by the established 
democracies with strong economies to exploit transitional governments and non-
democracies through expanding the range of exploitative investment to bring 
poorer countries in the ambit of influence. Such an expansion feeds on cheap 
labour. The destination countries of such investment also work as dumping 
ground for the industrial waste.   
Steiner (2015) studies macro-level dataset on legislative elections in 23 
established democracies over the period 1965-2006 to test the hypothesis that 
higher levels of economic globalization result in lower turnout (for voting). The 
results of the study emphatically indicate that economic globalization has 
negative effects on electoral turnout in established democracies on account of 
reduced party polarization (low dispersion) with limited option with regard to 
economic policy that also induces citizens to think of contesting parties as having 
less influence on the economy. In view of this, globalization may have a negative 
effect on public participation in the political domain.   
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Nayyar (2015) observes that the relationship between democracy and 
globalization is dialectical rather than linear or unidirectional. The causation runs 
in both directions in different spheres whose interaction shapes the outcome. 
Stein (2016) investigates into the question whether a sovereign state system, 
democratic governments, and an integrated global marketplace can coexist. It 
assesses analytic materialist arguments for their incompatibility and the key 
assumptions on which they rest. It “describes the extant pressures operating to 
limit each of the three: how sovereignty and democracy work to constrain 
globalization, how globalization and sovereignty generate a democratic deficit, 
and how globalization and democracy lead to limitations upon, and even the 
transcendence of, sovereignty.”  
Haffoudhi and Bellakhal (2016) finds that the impact of globalization on 
democracy is demographic-regime specific. Countries that overlooked Malthusian 
constraints fostered democracy, whereas countries with late demographic 
transitions, suffering yet of Malthusian constraints, famines and chronic under-
nutrition or failed to invest in human capital and consequently have had 
inefficient resource allocation, also fail to promote democracy.   
Kollias and Paleologou (2016) studies the relationship between KOF 1 
globalization indices and Polity measures of democracy in 110 countries of 
different income levels (high, medium and low) for the period 1970-2011 and 
finds a positive impact of globalization on democracy, but this is not universally 
true across all income groups since any effect exerted by globalization on 
democracy may differ depending on a country’s attributes.   
This brief review of research suggests that the relationship between 
globalization and democracy (or the political regime of whatever type) may not be 
direct. It is mediated by the country-specific institutions, class interests, resource 
endowments, institutional structure, demographic characteristics, involvement 
and effectiveness of the national government in proper management of the 
economy and the polity and so on. Depending on mediating forces globalization 
and democratization may have mutually reinforcing or mutually conflicting 
relationship. However, irrespective of the country-specific scenarios, a canonical 
correlation analysis of the measures of democracy and the measures of 
globalization of a large number of countries indicates that democracy and 
globalization are conformal to each other. 
                                                          
1 KOF [Konjunkturforschungsstelle or Economic Research Centre of ETH Zurich]. 2017 Index of 
globalization. http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/media/filer_public/2017/04/19/rankings_2017.pdf 
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2. The Present Study 
The investigation at hand acknowledges bi-directional causality between 
globalization and democracy (or the political regime that has full democracy at the 
one end and authoritarianism at the other). It holds that the regime type affects 
the extent of globalization and also that globalization affects the regime type 
tending to favour democratization.      
To capture the bi-directional causality mentioned above, this study 
constructs a simultaneous equation model in which five measures (detailed out 
below) of different aspects of a regime, ranging between the two poles of full 
democracy and authoritarianism, aim at explaining six indicators of globalization 
(detailed out below). Additionally, some of the indicators of globalization 
influence the overall index of democracy. The globalization indicators as well as 
the overall index of democracy are, thus, the endogenous variables in the model 
while the indicators of political regime are predetermined (exogenous) variables.  
The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), a British business within the Economist 
Group has published the Democracy Index for 2006, 2008 and 2011 and for every 
year afterwards up to 2016. The index is based on 60 indicators grouped in five 
different categories or dimensions of regime ranging from democracy to 
authoritarianism. These categories are:  Electoral process and pluralism (EPP), 
Functioning of government (FOG), Political participation (PPN), Political culture 
(PCL) and Civil liberties (CVL), each one measured by an index.  
The five measures of different aspects of democracy (EPP, FOG, PPN, PCL and 
CVL) mentioned above pertaining to any particular year may be suitably weighted 
and aggregated to yield an overall index (DI, or the Index of Democracy with the 
score value in the range of zero to ten). On the basis of the score value (DI) the 
political systems of different countries may be classified into Full democracies 
(score value in 8-10 range), Flawed democracies (score value in 6 to below-8 
range), Hybrid regimes (score value in 4 to below-6 range) and authoritarian 
regimes (score value below 4).  
The KOF2 visualizes three aspects of globalization: economic, social and 
political. The economic aspect of globalization is measured by two indices, the 
social aspect of globalization is measured by three indices and the political aspect 
has only one measure. The indices of globalization are, thus, six in number. They 
are:  (1) E1 - actual economic flows such as trans-border trade, direct investment 
and portfolio investment, (2) E2 - relaxation of restrictions on trans-border trade 
                                                          
2 KOF [Konjunkturforschungsstelle or Economic Research Centre of ETH Zurich]. 2017 Index of 
globalization. http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/media/filer_public/2017/04/19/rankings_2017.pdf 
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as well as capital movement by means of taxation, tariff, etc., (3) S1 - trans-border 
personal contacts such as degree of tourism, telecom traffic, postal interactions, 
etc., (4) S2 - flow of information, (5) S3 - cultural proximity, and (6) P - the 
measure of trans-national political set up. All the six (E1 through P), by a scheme 
of linear combination, are used to arrive at the overall composite index of 
globalization (say, Γ) as described in Dreher (2006) and Dreher et al. (2008). 
Mishra (2017) uses Almost Equi-Marginal Contribution (AEMC) principle for 
making a linear combination of globalization aspect indicators E through P. Unlike 
the KOF index of globalization (based on linear aggregation through the Principal 
Component Analysis), the AEMC index of globalization is based on the linear 
aggregation such that the expected mean marginal contributions (Shapley value 
shares) of all constituent variables to the synthetic index are as close to each 
other as possible. The composite index of globalization based on AEMC principle 
may be denoted by G. 
Table 1. Summary for Data Abbrevation and  Description 
Abbrevation Description 
EPP Electoral process and pluralism; 
FOG Functioning of government; 
PPN Political participation; 
PCL Political culture; 
CVL Civil liberties; 
DI Index of Democracy with score value range between 0-10; 
E1 Actual economic flows such as trans-border trade, direct investment and portfolio investment; 
E2 Relaxation of restrictions on trans-border trade as well as capital movement by means of taxation, tariff, etc.; 
S1 Trans-border personal contacts such as degree of tourism, telecom traffic, postal interactions, etc.; 
S2  Flow of information; 
S3  Cultural proximity; 
P The measure of trans-national political set up.  
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3. A Simultaneous Equation Model of Globalization and Regime Type 
Since our study visualizes a bi-directional causal relationship between 
democracy (political regime type) and globalization, the measures of different 
aspects (economic, social and political) of globalization are endogenous variables 
that directly or indirectly influence each other.  The overall democracy index at a 
later date (DI16 for the year 2016) also is one of the endogenous variables 
influenced by the globalization indices of the earlier date (during 2006-2014). The 
measures of different aspects of democracy (for the year 2006) are the 
predetermined (exogenous) variables.   Our simultaneous equation model is given 
in the schematic form as under. We have made a comparative study of two 
scenarios that we describe in the next section. In the model below, t is denoting 
pessimistic or optimistic vector pertaining to the two scenarios. All the 
relationships in the model characterize following linear equations (abbreviations 
in table 1). 
𝐸𝐸1𝑡𝑡 = 𝑓𝑓(𝐸𝐸2𝑡𝑡 ,𝑆𝑆1𝑡𝑡 ,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹06,𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃06,𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃06)                                                    𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒. (01) 
𝐸𝐸2𝑡𝑡 = 𝑓𝑓(𝑆𝑆2𝑡𝑡 ,𝑆𝑆3𝑡𝑡 ,𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 ,𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃06,𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃06)                                                             𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒. (02) 
𝑆𝑆1𝑡𝑡 = 𝑓𝑓(𝐸𝐸1𝑡𝑡 ,𝑆𝑆3𝑡𝑡 ,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹06,𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃06,𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃06)                                                     𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒. (03) 
𝑆𝑆2𝑡𝑡 = 𝑓𝑓(𝐸𝐸2𝑡𝑡 ,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹06,𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃06,𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃06,𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃06)                                               𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒. (04) 
𝑆𝑆3𝑡𝑡 = 𝑓𝑓(𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 ,𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃06,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹06,𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃06,𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃06)                                                  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒. (05) 
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = 𝑓𝑓(𝐸𝐸1𝑡𝑡 ,𝐸𝐸2𝑡𝑡 ,𝑆𝑆1𝑡𝑡 ,𝑆𝑆2𝑡𝑡 ,𝑆𝑆3𝑡𝑡)                                                                       𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒. (06) 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷16 = 𝑓𝑓(𝐸𝐸2𝑡𝑡 ,𝑆𝑆1𝑡𝑡 ,𝑆𝑆2𝑡𝑡 ,𝑆𝑆3𝑡𝑡 ,𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡)                                                                      𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒. (07) 
 
4. Data on the Measures of Democracy and Globalization 
Under our study there are 116 countries distributed over the continents, viz. 
Africa, the Americas, Asia, Australia, Europe and Oceania. These countries 
together represent all types of political regime (full democracy to authoritarian) 
and all levels of globalization (very low, medium and high). The data used by us 
are presented in the appended tables: Table A1, Table A2 and Table A3. 
In table A1 we present five measures for democracy (EPPi06, FOGi06, PPNi06, 
PCLi06 and CVLi06; i=1 through 116) for the year 2006 as well as the overall measure 
of democracy for 2016. The measures of democracy for 2006 make our exogenous 
variables while the overall measure of democracy for 2016 (DIi16 i=1,2,..., 116) is 
one of our endogenous variables. 
S.K. Mishra / JEFA Vol:2 No:1 (2018) 99-128 
 
Page | 106 
 
 As to the measures of different aspects of globalization, we have used the 
KOF indices3 for the period 2006-2014. However, we have not used a time series 
data for any country under study for the entire period 2006-2014. From the 
available time series over the years (for all countries under study), we have 
formed two scenarios. For any particular 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ  country (among 116 countries 
considered in the study at hand) we have G for 9 years, 2006-2014 that we denote 
by Gij ; j=2006 through 2014 and i=1 through 116.  
For every Gij we have the associated sub-indices [E1ij, E2ij, S1ij, S2ij, S3ij and Pij ; 
j=2006 through 2014 and i=1 through 116]. We have constructed two vectors:  (1)        �𝐸𝐸1𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 ,  𝐸𝐸2𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 ,  𝑆𝑆1𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 ,𝑆𝑆2𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 ,𝑆𝑆3𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 ,𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 �  
which is associated with 
𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖
𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 = 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚
𝑗𝑗
�𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ;𝑗𝑗 ∈ [2006,2014] �   where 𝑖𝑖 = 1, 2, 3, … , 116 
that gives us the set of values associated with the lowest extent of globalization 
experienced by any country during 2006-2014.  
Similarly, (2)        [𝐸𝐸1𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ,  𝐸𝐸2𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ,  𝑆𝑆1𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ,𝑆𝑆2𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ,𝑆𝑆3𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ,𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ]  
which is associated with 
𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑗𝑗
�𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ;𝑗𝑗 ∈ [2006,2014] �   where 𝑖𝑖 = 1, 2, 3, … , 116 
that gives us the set of values associated with the highest extent of globalization 
experienced by any country during 2006-2014.  We may call them pessimistic 
(associated with minG ) and optimistic (associated with maxG ) vectors of 
globalization. We have these two vectors as our endogenous variables for 
estimating the model for pessimistic effects of the indicators of the political 
regime and optimistic effects of the indicators of the political regime.  
5. Estimation of the Model 
There are several methods to estimate a simultaneous equation model that 
may be primarily classified into two groups: (1) single equation methods, and (2) 
system methods. The single equation methods are easy to apply and free from the 
undesirable effects of misspecification of other equations in the model, but they 
are susceptible to the detrimental effects of disturbances correlated across the 
                                                          
3 KOF [Konjunkturforschungsstelle or Economic Research Centre of ETH Zurich]. 2017 Index of 
globalization. http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/media/filer_public/2017/04/19/rankings_2017.pdf 
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equations. The system methods are cumbersome and susceptible to the problems 
of misspecification of equations in the model, but they perform well even if the 
disturbances across the equations are correlated. Between the single equation 
and the system methods of estimation, thus, there is a trade-off between 
deleterious effects of ‘misspecification’ and ‘correlated residuals across the 
equations’ in the model. Since little is known about correct specification of 
different equations in our model, we have favoured the single equation method 
of estimation for ease in computation as well as for avoiding the possible risk in 
proceeding to the system method of estimation under the circumstances of 
misspecification.  We also do not have reasons to assume the disturbances in the 
equations to be normally distributed. Under these circumstances we have chosen 
the Two-Stage Least Squares (2-SLS) method of estimation since it handles 
instrumental variables in a very natural manner. 
5.1. The Two-Stage Least Squares for structural Equations 
If an econometric model is specified as YA + XB + U = 0 (where Y are 
current endogenous and X are predetermined variables), the 2-SLS method first 
obtains the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) based expected values of Y by the 
relationship 𝑌𝑌� = XC (where C is the matrix of reduced form coefficients) and in 
order to proceed to the second stage substitute the estimated 𝑦𝑦�  for observed y in 
the equation wherever it is a regressor variable (and not the regressand variable). 
Thus, among the regressor variables 𝑦𝑦�  would be used as an instrumental variable 
(Reiersol, 1945) representing y, while x is its own instrument. This approach 
renders the use of OLS at the second stage free from the stochastic regressor 
problem.  
5.2. Possible Collinearity among Regressors at the 2nd Stage and its 
Treatment 
However, since at the second stage, the 2-SLS uses the estimated values of 
some endogenous variables together with some predetermined variables as 
regressors, collinearity among the regressor variables may arise. This is because 
the estimated values of endogenous variables are the linear functions of the 
predetermined variables in the model. Collinearity may affect standard errors of 
the estimated parameters. Signs of the estimated parameters also may be wrong 
(Smith and Brainard, 1976). In view of this, we have also used the Shapley value 
regression at the second stage of 2-SLS and compared the results of this choice 
with the conventional method that uses OLS at the second stage. 
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5.3. The Shapley Value Regression 
Shapley value regression significantly ameliorates the deleterious effects of 
collinearity on the estimated parameters of a regression equation. The concept of 
Shapley value was introduced in (cooperative collusive) game theory where 
agents form collusion and cooperate with each other to raise the value of a game 
in their favour and later divide it among themselves.  Distribution of the value of 
the game according to Shapley decomposition has been shown to have many 
desirable properties (Roth, 1988, pp.1-10) including linearity, unanimity, 
marginalism, etc. Following this theory of sharing of the value of a game, the 
Shapley value regression decomposes the R2 of a conventional regression (which 
is considered as the value of the collusive cooperative game) such that the mean 
expected marginal contribution of every predictor variable (agents in collusion to 
explain the variation in y, the dependent variable) sums up to R2.  
The scheme of Shapley value regression is simple. Suppose z is the 
dependent variable and x1, x2, ... , xk ∈ X are the predictor variables, which may 
have strong collinearity. Let Yi ⊂ X in which xi ∈ X is not there or  xi ∉ Yi. Thus, Yi  
will have only k-1 variables. We draw r (r=0, 1, 2, ... , k-1) variables from Yi  and let 
this collection of variables so drawn be called Pr such that Pr ⊆ Yi .  Also, Yi = Yi ∪ ∅. 
Now, Pr  can be drawn in L=kCr ways. Also, let Qr = Pr ∪ xi. Regress (least squares) z 
on Qr to find R2q. Regress (least squares) z on Pr  to obtain R2p. The difference 
between the two R-squares is Dr = R2q - R2p, which is the marginal contribution of xi  
to z. This is done for all L combinations for a given r and arithmetic mean of Dr 
(over the sum of all L values of Dr) is computed. Once it is obtained for each r, its 
arithmetic mean is computed. Note that Pr is null for r=0, and thus Qr contains a 
single variable, namely xi. Further, when Pr is null, its R2 is zero. The result is the 
arithmetic average of the mean (or expected) marginal contributions of xi to z. 
This is done for all xi; i=1, k to obtain the Shapley value (Si) of xi; i=1, k. In the 
regression model z=Xb+u, the OLS gives a value of R2. The sum of all Si; i=1,2, ..., k 
is equal to R2. Thus, OLS R2 has been decomposed. Once all Shapley value shares 
are known, one may retrieve the coefficients (with original scale and origin) by 
solving an optimization problem suggested by Lipovetsky (2006) using any 
appropriate optimization method. A simple algorithm and computer program is 
available in Mishra (2016).  
6. Empirical Findings 
As pointed out earlier, we have used two alternative vectors of globalization 
measures, the one related to Gmin and the other related to Gmax. Therefore, we 
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have two parallel findings, the one for a pessimistic view and the other for an 
optimistic view of globalization.  
The reduced form coefficients matrices C (based on OLS) are given in table 2 
for pessimistic and optimistic views of globalization at Panel A and Panel B 
respectively. Their standard errors are not presented because the coefficients are 
used only to obtain the expected values of endogenous variables. 
Table 2. Estimated Reduced Form Coefficients Matrix (Transposed C)  
Equation 
Number 
Regressand 
Variable 
Reduced Form Coefficients of Predictor Variables  
(All Predetermined) Relating to Political Regime R2 
EPP FOG PPN PCL CVL CONST 
Panel A: Pessimistic Scenario of Globalization  
1 E1 -0.09669 0.24146 0.24643 0.18092 0.08821 23.34796 0.3753 
2 E2 0.09687 0.28829 -0.00578 0.20171 0.00678 23.07078 0.5184 
3 S1 -0.14461 0.08996 0.21068 0.53211 0.30117 -12.02201 0.5231 
4 S2 -0.04587 0.05542 0.20342 0.31348 0.22407 21.23889 0.5171 
5 S3 -0.01793 0.42558 0.21272 0.55329 0.07899 -33.44582 0.4838 
6 P 0.00492 0.00730 0.19940 0.15338 0.09913 46.08075 0.2507 
7 DI 0.07114 0.20676 0.09848 0.23259 0.32429 3.07933 0.8982 
Panel B: Optimistic Scenario of Globalization  
1 E1 0.12400 0.10555 0.07432 0.20298 -0.06958 42.89204 0.2417 
2 E2 0.09679 0.23024 -0.02864 0.24574 0.05692 26.76866 0.5184 
3 S1 -0.16699 0.12057 0.22784 0.48374 0.30252 -8.67294 0.5180 
4 S2 -0.07373 0.08948 0.19270 0.30243 0.20114 25.23083 0.5035 
5 S3 -0.06626 0.45089 0.36109 0.43824 0.11419 -30.03597 0.4843 
6 P 0.06859 0.01120 0.17536 0.21128 -0.04321 52.97000 0.2898 
7 DI 0.07114 0.20676 0.09848 0.23259 0.32429 3.07933 0.8982 
Notes: Numbers in the table are coefficients of predictor variables estimated by OLS technique. 
Panel A pertains to globalization with pessimistic scenario, while panel B displays estimation with 
optimistic scenario. For descriptions of abbreviated variables see table 1. Equation numbers 
correspond to equations 1-7 explained in section 3. 
At the second stage, we estimate the structural parameters (A and B) by OLS 
(i.e. conventional 2-SLS) and present them in table 3 where Panel A and Panel B 
correspond to pessimistic and optimistic views respectively. As the proposed 
alternative at the second stage, we also estimate the structural parameters by 
Shapley value regression and present them in table 4 (pessimistic and optimistic 
views at Panel A and B respectively). It may be noted that obtaining the 
coefficients of the Shapley value regression we have to use an efficient 
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optimization method (Lipovetsky, 2006; Mishra, 2016). In the present study, this is 
done by the Host-Parasite Co-Evolutionary algorithm, which is a powerful 
biologically inspired population method of global optimization (Mishra, 2013). In 
table 3 and table 4, the current endogenous parameters matrix (A) has in the 
principal diagonal cells minus unity which pertains to the dependent endogenous 
variable in the equation concerned. A zero in an off-diagonal cell denotes that the 
endogenous variable is not included in the particular equation. Similarly, in B 
matrix, a zero in a cell denotes that the particular predetermined variable is not 
included in the equation concerned. 
Moreover, we also report standard errors of estimate of the coefficients 
corresponding to the Shapley value based 2-SLS structural coefficients reported in 
table 4 using Jackknife resampling technique. For both (Panel A and B) the t-value 
for all endogenous (but none of the predetermined) predictors are statistically 
significant at 1% level.  
Table 3. Estimated Structural Parameters Based on Conventional 2-SLS Estimation 
Eqs. 
No. 
Endogenous Variables (Transposed A Matrix) Predetermined Variables (Transposed B Matrix) 
R2 
E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P DI EPP FOG PPN PCL CVL CONST 
Panel A: Pessimistic Scenario of Globalization  
1 -1 0.7800 1.1911 0 0 0 0 0 -0.0910 0 -0.6100 -0.2760 19.6726 0.3753 
2 0 -1 0 1.4254 0.5535 -3.5950 0 0.1899 0 0.3030 0 0 176.946 0.5184 
3 1.6709 0 -1 0 -0.9450 0 0 0 0.0888 0 0.7528 0.2284 -82.6508 0.5231 
4 0 -0.4740 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0.1919 0.2010 0.4090 0.2273 32.1631 0.5171 
5 0 0 0 0 -1 0.7969 0 -0.0220 0.4198 0.0540 0.4311 0 -70.1672 0.4838 
6 -0.2110 -0.6580 -0.8960 1.5482 0.5704 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 41.6162 0.2507 
7 0 0.2382 -2.363 6.0177 0.096 -3.2440 -1 0 0 0 0 0 -5.9572 0.8982 
Panel B: Optimistic Scenario of Globalization  
1 -1 2.3547 0.6222 0 0 0 0 0 -0.5116 0 -0.6766 -0.3918 -14.7428 0.2417 
2 0 -1 0 0.0160 0.5052 0.0923 0 0.1251 0 -0.2303 0 0 36.6456 0.5184 
3 -0.9095 0 -1 0 0.8182 0 0 0 -0.1523 0 0.3098 0.1458 54.9108 0.5180 
4 0 -0.7618 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0.2649 0.1709 0.4896 0.2445 45.6232 0.5035 
5 0 0 0 0 -1 -2.6429 0 0.1150 0.4805 0.8245 0.9966 0 109.9563 0.4843 
6 1.2483 -0.6065 -0.0036 0.4164 -0.0394 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.9434 0.2898 
7 0 0.8967 -2.2264 4.6889 -0.3119 -0.9095 -1 0 0 0 0 0 -119.7295 0.8982 
Notes: Numbers in the table are coefficients of predictor variables estimated by conventional 2-OLS technique. Panel A 
presents estimation of globalization with pessimistic scenario, while panel B displays estimation with optimistic scenario. For 
descriptions of abbreviated variables see table 1. Equation numbers corresponds to equations 1-7 explained in section 3. 
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Table 4. Estimated Structural Parameters Based on Shapley-Value Regression 2-SLS 
Estimation 
Eqs. 
Endogenous Variables: Transposed A Matrix Predetermined Variables: Transposed B Matrix 
R2 
E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P DI EPP FOG PPN PCL CVL CONST 
Panel A: Pessimistic view  
1 - 
0.2246***     
(0.0346)    
[6.4913] 
0.1801***     
(0.0265)    
[6.7962] 
- - - - - 
0.1058     
(0.2062)    
[0.5131] 
- 
0.1413     
(0.1769)    
[0.7988] 
0.0857     
(0.1334)    
[0.6424] 
-41.2332     
(5.6861)    
[-7.2516] 
0.3618 
2 - - - 
0.1921***     
(0.0200)    
[9.605] 
0.1235***     
(0.0173)    
[7.1387] 
0.2956***     
(0.0316)    
[9.3544] 
- 
0.0669     
(0.1249)    
[0.5356] 
-
0.1025     
(0.1418)    
[0.7228] 
- - 
-47.4994     
(4.8967)    
[-9.7003] 
0.4803 
3 
0.3173***     
(0.0245)    
[12.951] 
- - - 
0.1711***     
(0.0141)    
[12.1348] 
- - - 
0.1374     
(0.1407)    
[0.9765] 
- 
0.2075     
(0.1916)    
[1.0830] 
0.1146     
(0.1970)    
[0.5817] 
-52.7262     
(4.9762)    
[-10.5957] 
0.5040 
4 - 
0.2622***     
(0.0265)    
[9.8943] 
- - - - - - 
0.1158     
(0.1414)    
[0.8190] 
0.1397     
(0.2119)    
[0.6593] 
0.1682     
(0.2010)    
[0.8368] 
0.1077     
(0.1581)    
[0.6812] 
-45.3551     
(3.7463)    
[-12.1066] 
0.5058 
5 - - - - - 
0.6622***     
(0.0872)    
[7.594] 
- 
0.1198     
(0.2107)    
[0.5686] 
0.2281     
(0.3092)    
[0.7377] 
0.2233     
(0.3342)    
[0.6682] 
0.2903     
(0.3822)    
[0.7595] 
-
-95.9363     
(10.7596)    
[-8.9163] 
0.4653 
6 
0.1334***     
(0.0224)    
[5.9554] 
0.1300***     
(0.0245)    
[5.3061] 
0.0993***     
(0.0173)    
[5.7399] 
0.1444***     
(0.0316)    
[4.5696] 
0.0706***     
(0.0141)    
[5.0071] 
- - - - - - - 
-31.8045     
(5.2208)    
[-6.0919] 
0.2392 
7 - 
0.3241***     
(0.0141)    
[22.9858] 
0.2197***     
(0.0100)    
[21.9700] 
0.2931***     
(0.0100)    
[29.3100] 
0.1585*** 
(0.0058) 
[27.3276] 
0.4340***     
(0.0173)    
[25.0867] 
- - - - - - 
-84.8041     
(3.1439)    
[-26.9742] 
0.8480 
Panel B: Optimistic view  
1 - 
0.1783***     
(0.0363)    
[4.9118] 
0.1106***     
(0.0239)    
[4.6276] 
- - - - - 
0.0740     
(0.1470)    
[0.5034] 
- 
0.0929     
(0.1685)    
[0.5513] 
0.0614     
(0.1193)    
[0.5147] 
-30.2465     
(5.1579)    
[-5.8641] 
0.2295 
2 - - - 
0.2071***     
(0.0197)    
[10.5127] 
0.1157***     
(0.0126)    
[9.1825] 
0.3142***     
(0.0339)    
[9.2684] 
- 
0.0693     
(0.1516)    
[0.4571] 
-
0.1051     
(0.1204)    
[0.8729] 
- - 
-51.7940     
(5.0830)       
[-10.1897] 
0.4816 
3 
0.4186***     
(0.0386)    
[10.8446] 
- - - 
0.1708***     
(0.0141)    
[12.1135] 
- - - 
0.1327     
(0.1497)    
[0.8864] 
- 
0.2071     
(0.2334)    
[0.8873] 
0.1117     
(0.2075)    
[0.5383] 
-62.6993     
(6.1482)    
[-10.198] 
0.4950 
4 - 
0.2502***     
(0.0240)    
[10.425] 
- - - - - - 
0.1087     
(0.1337)    
[0.8130] 
0.1289     
(0.2028)    
[0.6356] 
0.1635     
(0.1855)    
[0.8814] 
0.0969     
(0.1367)    
[0.7089] 
-44.1332     
(3.7357)    
[-11.8139] 
0.4922 
5 - - - - - 
0.7641***     
(0.0753)    
[10.1474] 
- 
0.1297     
(0.2202)    
[0.5890] 
0.2512     
(0.3311)    
[0.7587] 
0.2468     
(0.3410)    
[0.7238] 
0.2919     
(0.3301)    
[0.8843] 
-
-109.4473     
(10.224)    
[-10.7049] 
0.4720 
6 
0.1968***     
(0.0405)    
[4.8593] 
0.1237***     
(0.0178)    
[6.9494] 
0.0862***     
(0.0156)    
[5.5256] 
0.1179***     
(0.0210)    
[5.6143] 
0.0599***     
(0.0100)    
[5.9900] 
- - - - - - - 
-35.4534     
(5.3336)    
[-6.6472] 
0.2735 
7 - 
0.3319***     
(0.0136)    
[24.4044] 
0.2273***     
(0.0115)    
[19.7652] 
0.3195***     
(0.0160)    
[19.9688] 
0.1487***     
(0.0058)    
[25.6379] 
0.4421***     
(0.0209)    
[21.1531] 
- - - - - - 
-92.4873     
(3.3760)    
[-27.3955] 
0.8358 
Notes: Numbers in the table are coefficients of predictor variabled estimated by Shapley Value Regression 2-SLS technique; their 
standard errors and t-statistics are presented in parentheses and brackets respectively.  The standard errors are derived by Jackknife 
resampling technique. Panel A presents estimation of globalization with pessimistic scenario, while panel B displays estimation with 
optimistic scenario. For descriptions of abbreviated variables see table 1. Equation numbers corresponds to equations 1-7 explained in 
section 3.  
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In the last column of tables 2-4, the R2 values are reported corresponding to 
each equation. We observe that conventional 2-SLS at the second stage gives the 
R2 values that are identical to those obtained for the reduced form equations. 
However, the R2 values for the proposed 2-SLS (in which OLS is replaced by the 
Shapley value regression) are a little smaller than those given by the conventional 
2-SLS based on OLS. This cost has to be paid for treating the collinearity problem 
that has devastating effects on the coefficients of the structural equations. 
7. Interpretation 
In table 5 we present the Shapley value shares of the predictor variables (in 
R2) in different equations of the model for pessimistic and optimistic scenarios, 
respectively. Their percentage shares in the respective R2 also are reported.  A 
zero value in a cell(i,j) indicates that the jth predictor variable is absent in the ith 
equation. The symbol (-) in the principal diagonal cells is the cell for the ith 
dependent endogenous variable appearing in the ith equation. 
As to the significance of the Shapley share of a particular predictor in R2, the 
statistical tests (reported in table 4, though) are not yet well established. 
Nevertheless, as a thumb rule (which could be very robust) we may state that if R2 
is statistically significant (at, say, 1 percent level and the appropriate degrees of 
freedom) and there are k predictors, then 100/k is the most reasonable share 
(percentage) that could be attributed to any particular predictor when we have no 
knowledge of its factual contribution. This is based on the Principle of Insufficient 
Reason or the Principle of Indifference (Keynes, 1921, pp. 44-70), when no reason 
is known to distribute the shares differently.  On this logic, whenever the share of 
a predictor variable (5 in number in each equation) is 20 percent or more, it is 
surely significant. It may be noted that R2 for all equations are significant at 1 
percent. We use this thumb rule and accordingly we have underlined (in table 5) 
the percentage contribution of those predictors that are not less than 20 percent. 
A simple analysis is presented in table 6.  Equation-wise, we present the list 
of predictor variables that have Shapley value  shares 20% or more within square 
brackets [.], those having Shapley value shares not less than 19 percent but less 
than 20 percent in curly brackets {.} and those having Shapley value shares  not 
less than 18 percent but less than 19 percent in round brackets (.). We do not 
consider below 18 percent contribution. The symbol U stands for the ‘union’ set 
operator. Accordingly, we may assign the importance of the predictor variable. 
The lists are not identical in the two scenarios. But in any case, the bi-directional 
causality between democracy and globalization is established. The globalization 
variables E2 (relaxation of restrictions on trans-border trade as well as capital 
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movement by means of taxation, tariff, etc.) and S2 (flow of information) surely 
affect democratization (DI16). Among the exogenous (predetermined) variables, 
CVL (Civil liberties) is a weak and EPP (Electoral process and pluralism) is a very 
weak predictor. 
Table 5. Shapley-Value Shares of Predictors in R2 and their Percentage 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Notes: The numbers in the table are shares of predictor variables (estimated by Shapley Value decomposition) in 2-SLS R2, while their 
percentage weights are given in the parentheses. We have distinguished the ones whose percentage contribution in R2 is more than 
20% by underlining them. Panel A presents estimation of globalization with pessimistic scenario, while panel B displays estimation 
with optimistic scenario. For descriptions of abbreviated variables see table 1. Equation numbers corresponds to equations 1-7 
explained in section 3.  
 
Eqs. 
No. 
Endogenous Variables (Transposed A Matrix) Predetermined Variables (Transposed B Matrix) 
E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P DI EPP FOG PPN PCL CVL CONST 
Panel A: Pessimistic Scenario of Globalization 
1 - 0.0836 (22.26%) 
0.0949 
(25.28%) - - - - - 
0.0768 
(20.46%) - 
0.0663 
(17.65%) 
0.0538 
(14.35%) 
0.3753 
(100%) 
2 - - - 0.1135 (21.89%) 
0.1317 
(25.40%) 
0.1081 
(20.85%) - 
0.0849 
(16.38%) - 
0.0802 
(15.47%) - - 
0.5184 
(100%) 
3 0.1233 (23.58%) - - - 
0.1253 
(23.96%) - - - 
0.0894 
(17.09%) - 
0.1113 
(21.29%) 
0.0737 
(14.09%) 
0.5231 
(100%) 
4 - 0.1190 (23.01%) - - - - - - 
0.0955 
(18.46%) 
0.1076 
(20.81%) 
0.1017 
(19.67%) 
0.0933 
(18.04%) 
0.5171 
(100%) 
5 - - - - - 0.1180 (24.38%) - 
0.0590 
(12.20%) 
0.1174 
(24.26%) 
0.0860 
(17.77%) 
0.1035 
(21.38%) - 
0.4838 
(100%) 
6 0.0486 (19.38%) 
0.0458 
(18.25%) 
0.0493 
(19.67%) 
0.0595 
(23.73%) 
0.0476 
(18.97%) - - - - - - - 
0.2508 
(100%) 
7 - 0.1952 (21.73%) 
0.1661 
(18.50%) 
0.1880 
(20.93%) 
0.1697 
(18.89%) 
0.1792 
(19.95%) - - - - - - 
0.8982 
(100%) 
Panel B: Optimistic Scenario of Globalization 
1 - 0.0632 (26.14%) 
0.0513 
(21.21%) - - - - - 
0.0490 
(20.25%) - 
0.0401 
(16.58%) 
0.0382 
(15.82%) 
0.2417 
(100%) 
2 - - - 0.1171 (22.59%) 
0.1282 
(24.74%) 
0.1023 
(19.73%) - 
0.0895 
(17.27%) - 
0.0813 
(15.68%) - - 
0.5184 
(100%) 
3 0.1096 (21.16%) - - - 
0.1334 
(25.76%) - - - 
0.0899 
(17.35%) - 
0.1120 
(21.63%) 
0.073 
(14.1%) 
0.5180 
(100%) 
4 - 0.1187 (23.57%) - - - - - - 
0.0946 
(18.80%) 
0.1012 
(20.10%) 
0.1060 
(21.05%) 
0.083 
(16.48%) 
0.5035 
(100%) 
5 - - - - - 0.1155 (23.86%) - 
0.0619 
(12.79%) 
0.1219 
(25.18%) 
0.0934 
(19.28%) 
0.0915 
(18.89%) - 
0.4843 
(100%) 
6 0.0667 (23.00%) 
0.0548 
(18.92%) 
0.0547 
(18.86%) 
0.0576 
(19.89%) 
0.0560 
(19.32%) - - - - - - - 
0.2898 
(100%) 
7 - 0.2041 (22.72%) 
0.1729 
(19.25%) 
0.1922 
(21.40%) 
0.1731 
(19.27%) 
0.1559 
(17.36%) - - - - - - 
0.8982 
(100%) 
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Table 6. Equation-wise Strength of Predictor Variables According to the Shapley 
Value Shares 
Equations Pessimistic Scenario Optimistic Scenario 
1 E1=f([E2, S1, FOG] U {null} U (null)) E1=f([E2, S1, FOG] U {null} U (null)) 
2 E2=f([S2, S3, P] U {null} U (null)) E2=f([S2, S3] U {P} U (null)) 
3 S1=f([E1,S3,PCL] U{null} U (null)) S1=f([E1,S3,PCL] U{null} U (null)) 
4 S2=f([E2, PPN] U {PCL } U (FOG, CVL)) S2=f([E2, PPN, PCL] U {FOG} U (null)) 
5 S3=f([P, FOG, PCL] U {null} U (null)) S3=f([P, FOG] U {PPN} U (PCL)) 
6 P=f([S2] U {E1, S1} U (E2, S3)) P=f([E1] U {S2, S3} U (E2, S1)) 
7 DI16 =f([E2, S2] U {P} U (S1, S3)) DI16 =f([E2, S2] U {S1, S3} U (null)) 
Notes: [.] > 20%; 19% < {.} < 20%; 18% < (.) < 19%; we do not consider below 18% 
contribution. The symbol U stands for the “union” set operator. Equation numbers 
corresponds to equations 1-7 explained in section 3. 
In table 7 we present the list of predictor variables (equation-wise) that have 
negatively signed structural coefficients estimated by the conventional 2-SLS.  In 
the first equation (for E1) the democracy measures FOG (Functioning of 
Government), PCL (political Culture) and CVL (Civil Liberties) have negative sign. 
This is for both pessimistic and optimistic views of globalization. In the second 
equation P (political measure of globalization) or PPN (Political Participation) 
adversely affect E2 (relaxation of constraints on trans-border flow of goods, 
services and finance). In equation #3 trans-border personal contacts (S1) are 
adversely affected by cultural proximity (S3), trans-border flow of goods, services 
and finance (E1) or the Functioning of the Government (FOG). In equation #4, 
follow of information (S2) is adversely affected by relaxation of restrictions on 
trans-border trade and flow of finance (E2). In equation #4, cultural proximity (S3) 
is adversely affected by electoral process and pluralism (EPP) or political set up for 
enhancing globalization (P). In equation #6, the political set up for enhancing 
globalization is adversely affected by trans-border flow of goods, services and 
finance (E1), relaxation for restrictions on trans-border trade etc. (E2), trans-
border personal contacts and movement of people (S1) or trans-border cultural 
proximity (S3). It may be noted that most of these (negative) relationships are 
unexpected and misleading. They also indicate that different measures of 
globalization are not in concordance with each other. As to the final equation (#7 
for DI16), trans-border personal contacts and movement of people (S1), political 
set up for promoting globalization (P) and/or cultural proximity (S3) adversely 
affect democratization. 
 
S.K. Mishra / JEFA Vol:2 No:1 (2018) 99-128 
 
Page | 115 
 
Table 7. Predictor Variables that obtain Negatively Signed Structural Coefficients 
Estimated by the Conventional 2-SLS 
Equations 
Endogenous 
(Dependent) 
Variable 
Pessimistic Scenario  
of Globalization 
Optimistic Scenario  
of Globalization 
Predictor Variables Predictor Variables 
Endogenous Predetermined Endogenous Predetermined 
1 E1 - FOG, PCl, CVL - FOG, PCl, CVL 
2 E2 P - - PPN 
3 S1 S3 - E1 FOG 
4 S2 E2 - E2 - 
5 S3 - EPP P - 
6 P E1, E2, S1 - E2, S1, S3 - 
7 DI16 S1, P - S1, S3, P - 
Notes: Panel A presents estimation of globalization with pessimistic scenario, while panel B displays 
estimation with optimistic scenario. For descriptions of abbreviated variables see table 1. Equation 
numbers corresponds to equations 1-7 explained in section 3. 
In contrast, a perusal of table 4 (the structural coefficient matrices A’ and B’ 
obtained by the proposed Shapley value regression at the second stage) suggests 
that the coefficients associated with endogenous as well as predetermined 
variables (except constant terms) are all positive. They suggest that globalization 
measures are concordant with each other and the democratic regimes promote 
globalization. We also find that DI16 is positively affected by all predictor variables 
included in equation #7, indicating that globalization promotes democratization. 
The contrasting results obtained by the conventional 2-SLS and the proposed 
Shapley value based 2-SLS indicate that neither data nor the specification in our 
model were responsible for the unexpected results provided by the conventional 
2-SLS, but the problem was created by collinearity at the second stage of the 2-
SLS. A treatment of the problem of collinearity by using the Shapley value 
regression at the second stage of 2-SLS has rendered the results that are 
conformal to our expectation based on reasoned and realistic ground. 
In table 8 we present the correlation matrices of disturbances across the 
equations. A larger magnitude of correlation in an off-diagonal cell indicates cross 
correlation of residuals that may affect the efficiency of an equation method of 
estimation and prompt to seek for an application of any system method of 
estimation such as 3-SLS or FIML. A perusal of the elements of correlation 
matrices reveals that while for DI16 the cross correlations are often very small 
(irrespective of the view of globalization - pessimistic or optimistic,  and the 
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method of estimation - conventional or Shapley value regression based), this is 
only partially (but dominantly) true of P (the political dimension of globalization). 
However, this is not so for the economic (E1 and E2) and social (S1, S2 and S3) 
indicators of globalization in which most of the correlation coefficients are 
significantly large in magnitude. 
Table 8. Correlation Among Residuals at Stage-2 of Conventional and Shapley 
Value Based 2-SLS 
Eqs. 
No. 
End. 
Var. 
Conventional 2-SLS Shapley Value based 2-SLS 
E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P DI16 E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P DI16 
Panel A: Pessimistic Scenario of Globalization 
1 E1 1 0.387 0.575 0.560 0.280 -0.186 0.066 1 0.354 0.564 0.551 0.274 -0.180 0.008 
2 E2 0.387 1 0.517 0.563 0.472 -0.021 0.072 0.354 1 0.458 0.509 0.479 -0.050 0.073 
3 S1 0.575 0.517 1 0.660 0.466 -0.199 0.038 0.564 0.458 1 0.669 0.456 -0.189 -0.041 
4 S2 0.560 0.563 0.660 1 0.543 0.098 -0.056 0.551 0.509 0.669 1 0.529 0.103 -0.087 
5 S3 0.280 0.472 0.466 0.543 1 0.390 -0.047 0.274 0.479 0.456 0.529 1 0.359 -0.102 
6 P -0.186 -0.021 -0.199 0.098 0.390 1 0.078 -0.180 -0.050 -0.189 0.103 0.359 1 0.085 
7 DI16 0.066 0.072 0.038 -0.056 -0.047 0.078 1 0.008 0.073 -0.041 -0.087 -0.102 0.085 1 
Panel B: Optimistic Scenario of Globalization 
1 E1 1 0.347 0.553 0.509 0.205 -0.224 0.139 1 0.315 0.526 0.494 0.187 -0.204 0.097 
2 E2 0.347 1 0.528 0.599 0.479 -0.016 0.071 0.315 1 0.476 0.556 0.475 -0.048 0.093 
3 S1 0.553 0.528 1 0.696 0.512 -0.141 0.004 0.526 0.476 1 0.704 0.509 -0.130 -0.081 
4 S2 0.509 0.599 0.696 1 0.586 0.107 -0.005 0.494 0.556 0.704 1 0.582 0.111 -0.068 
5 S3 0.205 0.479 0.512 0.586 1 0.319 -0.053 0.187 0.475 0.509 0.582 1 0.297 -0.077 
6 P -0.224 -0.016 -0.141 0.107 0.319 1 0.134 -0.204 -0.048 -0.130 0.111 0.297 1 0.066 
7 DI16 0.139 0.071 0.004 -0.005 -0.053 0.134 1 0.097 0.093 -0.081 -0.068 -0.077 0.066 1 
Notes: Numbers in the table are correlation coefficients among residuals of conventional 2-SLS vis-á-
vis Shapley Value 2-SLS. For descriptions of abbreviated variables see table 1. Equation numbers 
corresponds to equations 1-7 explained in section 3. 
In table 9 we present the difference between the cross-equation correlation 
coefficients obtained by the conventional and the Shapley value based 2-SLS. This 
is for both views of globalization, pessimistic and optimistic. A positive value in 
the off-diagonal cell indicates that the cross-equation correlation of disturbances 
obtained by the conventional 2-SLS is stronger than the one obtained by the 
Shapley value regression based 2-SLS (while the negative value conveys the 
opposite). For the pessimistic view of globalization, in the upper diagonal cells of 
the difference matrix 21 (=7x(7-1)/2) elements are there. Out of them only 7 are 
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negative. It conveys that in two-third of cases the Shapley value based 2-SLS may 
be more efficient than the conventional 2-SLS. For the optimistic view of 
globalization, there are only 5 negative values in the upper diagonal cells of the 
difference matrix. It conveys that in (a little over) three-fourth of cases, the 
Shapley value based 2-SLS may be more efficient than the conventional 2-SLS. This 
also is one of the reasons why we consider that the Shapley value based 2-SLS has 
given better results than the conventional 2-SLS. 
Table 9. Difference between Correlation Among Residuals of Conventional versus 
Shapley Value Based 2-SLS 
Eqs. 
No. 
End. 
Var. 
Pessimistic Scenario of Globalization Optimistic Scenario of Globalization 
E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P DI16 E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P DI16 
Panel A: Pessimistic Scenario of Globalization 
1 E1 0 0.033 0.011 0.009 0.006 -0.006 0.058 0 0.032 0.027 0.015 0.018 -0.02 0.042 
2 E2 0.033 0 0.059 0.054 -0.007 0.029 -0.001 0.032 0 0.052 0.043 0.004 0.032 -0.022 
3 S1 0.011 0.059 0 -0.009 0.01 -0.01 0.079 0.027 0.052 0 -0.008 0.003 -0.011 0.085 
4 S2 0.009 0.054 -0.009 0 0.014 -0.005 0.031 0.015 0.043 -0.008 0 0.004 -0.004 0.063 
5 S3 0.006 -0.007 0.01 0.014 0 0.031 0.055 0.018 0.004 0.003 0.004 0 0.022 0.024 
6 P -0.006 0.029 -0.01 -0.005 0.031 0 -0.007 -0.02 0.032 -0.011 -0.004 0.022 0 0.068 
7 DI16 0.058 -0.001 0.079 0.031 0.055 -0.007 0 0.042 -0.022 0.085 0.063 0.024 0.068 0 
Notes: Numbers in the table are difference of correlation coefficients among residuals of 
conventional and Shapley Value 2-SLS. For descriptions of abbreviated variables see table 1. 
Equation numbers corresponds to equations 1-7 explained in section 3. 
8. Concluding Remarks 
On the basis of our analysis that models the relationship between democracy 
and globalization in a simultaneous equations framework, we conclude the 
following counts. First, democracy and globalization promote each other and 
hence there is a bi-directional causality with positive relationships running both 
ways between democracy and globalization as envisaged by Eichengreen and 
Leblang (2006). At a national level, there may be various intermediary conditions 
(such as institutional and historical factors, relative factor abundance, 
demographic reasons, influence and the self-interests of the elite class, safety 
nets for stability and building political support by the national government, etc.) 
that modify the relationship as well as set in motion a complex of positive and/or 
negative feedbacks to accelerate or retard the pace of globalization and 
democratization  in a country-specific manner. However, when a large number of 
countries are studied a clear relationship emerges out.  
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Second, there is a need to estimate the structural coefficients of the model 
cautiously since the regression equations may be suffering from collinearity 
among the predictor variables. The Shapley value regression based 2-SLS has 
performed better than the conventional regression in estimating the structural 
parameters of the model.  
Third, it is expected that the system methods of estimation of the model 
would give better results than what are obtained by the single equation methods 
of estimation of structural parameters of the model.  
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Appendix 
Table A1. Scores Obtained by Countries on the Measures in Different Dimensions 
of Democracy 
 Country 
Dimensions of Democracy – 2006 Democracy 
Index 2016 
(DI16) EPP FOG PPN PCL CVL 
1 Albania 7.33 5.07 4.44 5.63 7.06 5.91 
2 Algeria 2.25 2.21 2.22 5.63 3.53 3.56 
3 Argentina 8.75 5 5.56 5.63 8.24 6.96 
4 Australia 10 8.93 7.78 8.75 10 9.01 
5 Austria 9.58 8.21 7.78 8.75 9.12 8.41 
6 Azerbaijan 3.08 0.79 3.33 3.75 5.59 2.65 
7 Belgium 9.58 8.21 6.67 6.88 9.41 7.77 
8 Benin 6.83 6.43 3.89 6.88 6.76 5.67 
9 Bhutan 0.08 4.64 1.11 3.75 3.53 4.93 
10 Bolivia 8.33 5.71 4.44 3.75 7.65 5.63 
11 Botswana 9.17 7.86 5 6.88 9.12 7.87 
12 Brazil 9.58 7.86 4.44 5.63 9.41 6.9 
13 Bulgaria 9.58 5.71 6.67 5 8.53 7.01 
14 Burkina Faso 4 1.79 2.78 5.63 4.41 4.7 
15 Burundi 4.42 3.29 3.89 6.25 4.71 2.4 
16 C.Africa Rep. 0.42 1.43 1.67 1.88 2.65 1.61 
17 Cambodia 5.58 6.07 2.78 5 4.41 4.27 
18 Cameroon 0.92 3.21 2.78 5.63 3.82 3.46 
19 Canada 9.17 9.64 7.78 8.75 10 9.15 
20 Chad 0 0 0 5 3.24 1.5 
21 Chile 9.58 8.93 5 6.25 9.71 7.78 
22 China 0 4.64 2.78 6.25 1.18 3.14 
23 Colombia 9.17 4.36 5 4.38 9.12 6.67 
24 Congo D. Rep. 4.58 0.36 2.78 3.75 2.35 1.93 
25 Congo Rep. 4.58 0.36 2.78 3.75 2.35 2.91 
26 Costa Rica 9.58 8.21 6.11 6.88 9.41 7.88 
27 Cyprus 9.17 6.79 6.67 6.25 9.12 7.65 
28 Denmark 10 9.64 8.89 9.38 9.71 9.2 
29 Dominic Rep. 9.17 4.29 3.33 5.63 8.24 6.67 
30 Ecuador 7.83 4.29 5 3.13 7.94 5.81 
31 Egypt 2.67 3.64 2.78 6.88 3.53 3.31 
32 El Salvador 9.17 5.43 3.89 4.38 8.24 6.64 
33 Ethiopia 4 3.93 5 6.25 4.41 3.6 
34 Fiji 6.5 5.21 3.33 5 8.24 5.64 
35 Finland 10 10 7.78 8.75 9.71 9.03 
36 France 9.58 7.5 6.67 7.5 9.12 7.92 
37 Gabon 0.5 3.21 2.22 5.63 2.06 3.74 
38 Gambia  4 4.64 4.44 5.63 3.24 2.91 
39 Germany 9.58 8.57 7.78 8.75 9.41 8.63 
40 Ghana 7.42 4.64 4.44 4.38 5.88 6.75 
41 Greece 9.58 7.5 6.67 7.5 9.41 7.23 
42 Guatemala 8.75 6.79 2.78 4.38 7.65 5.92 
43 Guinea 1 0.79 2.22 3.75 2.35 3.14 
44 Guyana 8.33 5.36 4.44 4.38 8.24 6.25 
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45 Haiti 5.58 3.64 2.78 2.5 6.47 4.02 
46 Honduras 8.33 6.43 4.44 5 7.06 5.92 
47 Hungary 9.58 6.79 5 6.88 9.41 6.72 
48 Iceland 10 9.64 8.89 10 10 9.5 
49 India 9.58 8.21 5.56 5.63 9.41 7.81 
50 Indonesia 6.92 7.14 5 6.25 6.76 6.97 
51 Ireland 9.58 8.93 7.78 8.75 10 9.15 
52 Israel 9.17 6.64 7.78 7.5 5.29 7.85 
53 Italy 9.17 6.43 6.11 8.13 8.82 7.98 
54 Ivory Coast 1.25 2.86 3.33 5.63 3.82 3.81 
55 Jamaica 9.17 7.14 5 6.25 9.12 7.39 
56 Japan 9.17 7.86 5.56 8.75 9.41 7.99 
57 Jordan 3.08 3.79 3.89 5 3.82 3.96 
58 Kenya 4.33 4.29 5.56 6.25 5 5.33 
59 Kuwait 1.33 4.14 1.11 5.63 3.24 3.85 
60 Lebanon 7.92 2.36 6.11 6.25 6.47 4.86 
61 Lesotho 7.92 6.43 4.44 6.25 7.35 6.59 
62 Luxembourg 10 9.29 7.78 8.75 9.71 8.81 
63 Madagascar 5.67 5.71 5.56 6.88 5.29 5.07 
64 Malawi 6 5 3.89 4.38 5.59 5.55 
65 Malaysia 6.08 5.71 4.44 7.5 6.18 6.54 
66 Mali 8.25 5.71 3.89 5.63 6.47 5.7 
67 Malta 9.17 8.21 6.11 8.75 9.71 8.39 
68 Mauritania 1.83 4.29 2.22 3.13 4.12 3.96 
69 Mauritius 9.17 8.21 5 8.13 9.71 8.28 
70 Mexico 8.75 6.07 5 5 8.53 6.47 
71 Moldova 9.17 4.29 6.11 5 7.94 6.01 
72 Mongolia 9.17 6.07 3.89 5.63 8.24 6.62 
73 Montenegro 9.17 5.71 5 5.63 7.35 5.72 
74 Morocco 3.5 3.79 2.78 5.63 3.82 4.77 
75 Myanmar 0 1.79 0.56 5.63 0.88 4.2 
76 Nepal 0.08 3.57 2.22 5.63 5.59 4.86 
77 Netherlands 9.58 9.29 9.44 10 10 8.8 
78 New Zealand 10 8.57 8.33 8.13 10 9.26 
79 Nicaragua 8.25 5.71 3.33 3.75 7.35 4.81 
80 Niger 5.25 1.14 1.67 3.75 5.88 3.96 
81 Nigeria 3.08 1.86 4.44 4.38 3.82 4.5 
82 Norway 10 9.64 10 8.13 10 9.93 
83 Pakistan 4.33 5.36 0.56 4.38 5 4.33 
84 Panama 9.58 7.14 5.56 5.63 8.82 7.13 
85 Paraguay 7.92 5 5 4.38 8.53 6.27 
86 Peru 8.75 3.29 5.56 5 7.94 6.65 
87 Philippines 9.17 5.36 5 3.75 9.12 6.94 
88 Poland 9.58 6.07 6.11 5.63 9.12 6.83 
89 Portugal 9.58 8.21 6.11 7.5 9.41 7.86 
90 Romania 9.58 6.07 6.11 5 8.53 6.62 
91 Rwanda 3 3.57 2.22 5 5.29 3.07 
92 Saudi Arabia 0 2.36 1.11 4.38 1.76 1.93 
93 Senegal 7 5 3.33 5.63 5.88 6.21 
94 Sierra Leone 5.25 2.21 2.22 3.75 4.41 4.55 
95 Singapore 4.33 7.5 2.78 7.5 7.35 6.38 
96 South Africa 8.75 7.86 7.22 6.88 8.82 7.41 
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97 South Korea  9.58 7.14 7.22 7.5 7.94 7.92 
98 Spain 9.58 7.86 6.11 8.75 9.41 8.3 
99 Swaziland 1.75 2.86 2.22 3.13 4.71 3.03 
100 Sweden 10 10 10 9.38 10 9.39 
101 Switzerland 9.58 9.29 7.78 8.75 9.71 9.09 
102 Syria 0 1.79 1.67 6.88 1.47 1.43 
103 Tanzania 6 3.93 5.06 5.63 5.29 5.76 
104 Thailand 4.83 6.43 5 5.63 6.47 4.92 
105 Togo 0 0.79 0.56 5.63 1.76 3.32 
106 Trinid &Tobago 9.17 6.79 6.11 5.63 8.24 7.1 
107 Tunisia 0 2.36 2.22 6.88 3.82 6.4 
108 Turkey 7.92 6.79 4.44 3.75 5.59 5.04 
109 Uganda 4.33 3.93 4.44 6.25 6.76 5.26 
110 United Kingdom 9.58 8.57 5 8.13 9.12 8.36 
111 United States 8.75 7.86 7.22 8.75 8.53 7.98 
112 Uruguay 10 8.21 5 6.88 9.71 8.17 
113 Venezuela 7 3.64 5.56 5 5.88 4.68 
114 Vietnam 0.83 4.29 2.78 4.38 1.47 3.38 
115 Yemen 2.67 2.71 2.78 4.38 2.35 2.07 
116 Zambia 5.25 4.64 3.33 6.25 6.76 5.99 
 
Table A2. Economic, Social and Political Dimensions and Overall Indices of 
Globalization in Different Countries 
  Country Year-H E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P KOF AEMC 
1 Albania 2009 56.57 73 52.55 73.9 2.42 80.69 61.6 61.61 
2 Algeria 2006 55.36 52.55 32.39 64.92 1.93 80.65 54 53.32 
3 Argentina 2008 45.92 39.11 43.3 71.5 41.47 92.07 59.95 59.19 
4 Australia 2007 74.79 81.24 73.4 87.55 94.03 89.71 83.8 84.03 
5 Austria 2007 89.34 86.56 87.06 92.06 95.54 96.86 91.87 93.95 
6 Azerbaijan 2007 67.38 63.7 37.92 77.61 34.96 54.01 57.02 54.69 
7 Belgium 2007 96.71 82.81 81.94 96.39 91.22 97.67 92.41 93.75 
8 Benin 2014 53.79 42.92 28.55 39.46 2.48 75.17 46.67 48.99 
9 Bhutan 2014 60.64 56.77 46.83 45.54 6.87 38.85 43.58 47.07 
10 Bolivia 2006 62.03 59.79 39.52 51.01 3.78 75.69 54.42 56.38 
11 Botswana 2008 77.58 59.64 59.54 57.17 5.88 59.28 55.5 60.64 
12 Brazil 2014 51.77 52.82 24.46 70.5 39.58 94.3 61.4 58.16 
13 Bulgaria 2013 80.04 72.93 51.55 77.71 85.3 84.96 76.98 76.34 
14 Burkina Faso 2014 59.67 46.84 19.43 44.62 2.17 76.88 48.69 49.12 
15 Burundi 2014 23.53 33.37 21.02 37.22 3.1 62.17 35.04 34.79 
16 C. Africa Rep. 2014 49.56 28.29 13.44 40.71 2.24 58.39 36.34 37.27 
17 Cambodia 2014 85.86 50.76 29.52 48.48 1.31 62.36 50.69 54.22 
18 Cameroon 2014 44.96 38.31 16.91 52.02 2.24 73.16 44.2 42.75 
19 Canada 2007 76.2 82.03 80.78 94.74 96.09 92.91 87.15 87.51 
20 Chad 2006 55.49 27.21 23.94 32.35 2.91 60.04 38.37 41.7 
21 Chile 2007 82.68 87.08 41.25 77.69 41.18 87.67 74.31 72.77 
22 China 2014 43.49 62.19 18.71 65.65 78.37 84.26 62.02 56.85 
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23 Colombia 2013 58.32 57.38 33.46 69.69 38.12 79.65 60.15 58.23 
24 Congo D. Rep. 2013 69.13 37.26 6.23 43.38 1 62.03 41.67 42.31 
25 Congo Rep. 2014 96.24 41.58 35.45 43.93 1.25 63.67 51.83 57.31 
26 Costa Rica 2007 64.79 73.3 60.37 78.75 45.65 58.63 63.66 63.45 
27 Cyprus 2008 93.5 84.06 88.1 95.69 93.84 78.36 87.32 89.36 
28 Denmark 2007 87.8 89.09 83.64 89.59 93.06 93.75 90.01 91.9 
29 Dominic Rep. 2014 64.15 59.56 53.7 64.97 79.14 73.31 66.45 67.2 
30 Ecuador 2006 55.97 46 36.82 65.37 38.22 79.01 57.39 56.77 
31 Egypt 2013 42.96 48.68 27.64 66.78 77.77 93.01 63.1 59.62 
32 El Salvador 2007 61.06 72.79 49.35 64.68 40.8 75.4 63.79 64.02 
33 Ethiopia 2014 24.93 28.39 19.32 33.17 2.85 82.51 39.33 39.87 
34 Fiji 2014 74.43 25.7 56.98 57.2 43.56 69.68 57.56 61.3 
35 Finland 2007 85.16 87.39 72.07 90.6 91.67 91.64 87.22 87.36 
36 France 2007 76.99 87.19 80.56 88.36 91.79 97.96 88.23 89.36 
37 Gabon 2014 75.55 42.75 52.22 63.44 2.36 72.3 55.96 59.46 
38 Gambia  2006 70.76 49.68 45.63 57.79 6.31 61.86 51.78 54.92 
39 Germany 2007 81.36 84.49 76.35 87.52 92.57 92.43 86.48 87.44 
40 Ghana 2014 62.3 54.48 27.85 45.77 3.96 85.72 54.17 55.67 
41 Greece 2007 68.15 83.53 76.51 83.41 85.44 92.38 82.59 83.44 
42 Guatemala 2014 48 74.96 26.23 57.23 42.95 83.01 60.42 57.71 
43 Guinea 2014 57.21 31.29 21.72 41.38 2.73 76.19 44.4 46.82 
44 Guyana 2006 80.52 62.07 56.43 55.51 44.1 43.34 56.44 59.99 
45 Haiti 2010 34.21 62.93 28.71 50.84 1 45.88 39.36 38.47 
46 Honduras 2014 74.61 71.19 28.45 58.46 39.51 71.84 61.42 60.57 
47 Hungary 2009 92.14 85.86 65.93 89.31 89.62 91.47 86.99 87.02 
48 Iceland 2008 89.32 64.89 81.47 80.36 91.88 70.11 77.86 81.39 
49 India 2014 43.78 44.93 14.1 45.12 32.98 91.23 52.38 50.87 
50 Indonesia 2014 56.25 71.79 20.4 49.92 33.89 86.83 59.65 57.96 
51 Ireland 2014 99.52 89.78 89.37 91.72 91.88 90.47 92.15 95.2 
52 Israel 2010 71.59 83.51 75.06 67.25 90.37 80.29 78.15 80.79 
53 Italy 2007 68.17 83.24 70.46 78.72 86.52 97.92 82.85 83.57 
54 Ivory Coast 2007 63.35 40.17 41.85 52.15 2.85 70.72 49.83 53.08 
55 Jamaica 2007 80.64 70 63.13 69.52 7.11 68.56 62.72 66.57 
56 Japan 2014 50.41 76.54 43.39 75.59 87.91 88.1 72.26 68.81 
57 Jordan 2006 79.36 59.47 67.97 71.54 41.11 84.27 70.31 73.94 
58 Kenya 2007 27.19 46.79 29.61 46.02 3.72 82.92 46.46 45.8 
59 Kuwait 2008 61.31 75.01 78.96 76.28 90.41 59.54 70.76 72.18 
60 Lebanon 2006 86.92 62.3 70.38 81.04 43.26 74.55 70.5 74.2 
61 Lesotho 2014 80.48 41.22 25.58 48.74 6.87 54.09 45.94 48.77 
62 Luxembourg 2007 100 88.46 96.09 97.51 48.25 80.06 85.62 89.59 
63 Madagascar 2014 62.47 36.71 11.21 48.02 2.73 65.1 42.9 42.98 
64 Malawi 2013 49.9 52.47 26.25 41.95 6.99 64.35 45.4 46.09 
65 Malaysia 2010 89.03 69.62 64.71 75.92 87.52 83.17 79.12 81.07 
66 Mali 2014 50.97 41.67 22.46 44.1 1.12 75.98 46.07 46.72 
67 Malta 2009 99.76 87.06 83.18 96.04 49.74 52.58 76.16 78.24 
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68 Mauritania 2014 79.3 58.16 19.77 51.82 1.37 66.99 51.45 52.55 
69 Mauritius 2014 91.12 84.89 58.78 82.06 42.61 45.32 66.61 66.81 
70 Mexico 2014 63.45 68.45 44.3 68.92 40.12 71.72 62.29 61.61 
71 Moldova 2007 67.96 69.67 44.9 84.17 39.27 67.22 64.04 61.7 
72 Mongolia 2014 84.88 65.73 16.76 59.4 1.43 71.89 56.91 55.63 
73 Montenegro 2010 81.65 79.55 72.69 94.41 5.08 56.33 65.48 66.92 
74 Morocco 2014 60.71 53.68 45.87 83.86 37.71 89.5 65.95 64.33 
75 Myanmar 2014 56.93 56.33 11.89 42.07 1 44.74 39.03 38.4 
76 Nepal 2013 13.26 39.95 24.97 44.85 2.79 70.69 38.18 36.7 
77 Netherlands 2014 97.64 88.48 85.98 93.26 92.75 95.41 92.84 95.24 
78 New Zealand 2008 76.62 90.04 79.32 91.46 50.44 80.05 79.17 80.12 
79 Nicaragua 2012 61.15 61.69 34.97 56.57 40.24 57.38 53.99 53.56 
80 Niger 2014 54.67 50.44 32.41 35.3 1.74 74.33 47.92 50.86 
81 Nigeria 2009 65.1 47.51 12.39 52.93 3.47 89.37 54.36 52.53 
82 Norway 2013 80.32 72.93 81.74 85.52 91.68 92.27 84.48 86.83 
83 Pakistan 2007 40.85 43.25 23.4 44.12 32.38 87.55 51.83 51.16 
84 Panama 2009 89.59 71.32 50.84 81.17 47.74 60.74 67.7 67.56 
85 Paraguay 2012 62.44 56.59 36.33 65.09 39.86 77.61 60.13 59.39 
86 Peru 2011 69.02 82.53 32.33 58.27 36.87 84.74 66.14 65.24 
87 Philippines 2006 65.22 52.73 30.26 49.7 39.96 81.96 58.39 59.19 
88 Poland 2014 77.73 76.38 57.4 92.23 89.22 88.82 81.32 79.32 
89 Portugal 2007 82.71 87.1 76.48 91.1 88.73 93.85 87.61 88.21 
90 Romania 2014 60.67 83.22 48.07 82.02 82.39 89.82 76.51 73.36 
91 Rwanda 2014 34.81 63.91 17.27 39.87 7.05 71.53 45.56 43.83 
92 Saudi Arabia 2009 62.95 76.19 69 71.18 83.25 60.43 68.43 69.75 
93 Senegal 2012 57.58 47.32 29.33 58.91 3.53 87.9 54.64 54.59 
94 Sierra Leone 2011 69.7 46.89 19.84 38.92 3.16 65.1 45.9 48.29 
95 Singapore 2009 99.01 95.35 92.18 88.25 96.12 71.77 88.27 91.52 
96 South Africa 2014 72.64 65.18 41.53 61.39 41.93 88.04 66.72 67.54 
97 South Korea  2014 62.52 63.76 43.81 73.55 42.42 89.58 67.03 66.05 
98 Spain 2007 78.33 81.36 74.93 87.72 90.22 95.93 85.92 86.71 
99 Swaziland 2014 77.83 43.61 59.31 60.2 6.37 36.55 47.48 51.92 
100 Sweden 2007 88.33 86.26 80.84 84.38 94.73 96.03 89.41 91.73 
101 Switzerland 2014 95.02 70.51 91.77 87.57 94.47 93.4 88.79 93.18 
102 Syria 2011 53.48 55.43 51.94 65.49 1 52.73 48.93 50.02 
103 Tanzania 2007 35.61 53.2 16.78 31.93 3.04 55.74 37.71 37.42 
104 Thailand 2012 83.87 59.54 42.9 72.93 80.93 81.22 72.06 71.71 
105 Togo 2014 78.62 46.54 25.04 57.99 3.72 73.38 53.7 54.25 
106 Trinid &Tobago 2012 86.13 68.86 58.65 67.24 41.73 53.54 63.09 65.62 
107 Tunisia 2008 70.83 48.71 41.68 76.78 2.67 86.29 60.45 60.63 
108 Turkey 2014 51.09 66.13 50.76 72.49 81.59 91.88 71.33 69.88 
109 Uganda 2013 44.01 58.02 21.59 37.01 4.52 70.23 45.48 45.69 
110 United Kingdom 2006 81.91 89.75 79.57 90.54 93.3 94.9 89.06 89.91 
111 United States 2007 65.17 85.34 67.13 82.45 91.9 92.1 81.8 81.15 
112 Uruguay 2008 65.66 68.87 51.35 65.92 42.1 85.45 67.23 68.14 
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113 Venezuela 2006 62.32 47.83 38.48 68.43 41.65 65.68 56.17 55.45 
114 Vietnam 2014 80.26 49.28 16.43 63.78 31.92 71.13 56.69 54.98 
115 Yemen 2008 53.37 63.83 23.57 41.91 1.68 62.24 46.51 46.66 
116 Zambia 2007 64.24 63.96 27.92 45.69 4.09 73.93 52.96 54.04 
E1, E2, S1, S2, S3, P and KOF are for the Year-H when the overall index AEMC attained maximum (Gmax) during 
2006-2014. AEMC Indices are computed by the author. 
 
Table A3. Economic, Social and Political Dimensions and Overall Indices of 
Globalization in Different Countries 
  Country Year-L E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P KOF AEMC 
1 Albania 2006 35.89 58.68 52.56 69.39 2.24 67.63 51.18 50.86 
2 Algeria 2007 49.62 47.76 33.94 64.81 2.05 48.49 43.47 42.36 
3 Argentina 2012 41.13 30.68 43.54 72.69 40.54 92.83 57.89 57.09 
4 Australia 2013 68.41 78.01 73.79 85.8 92.9 90.42 81.97 82.24 
5 Austria 2013 85.52 76.5 86.51 91.31 95.46 96.36 89.09 91.36 
6 Azerbaijan 2009 59.96 57.99 38.9 78.95 34.51 55.51 55.35 52.78 
7 Belgium 2013 95.51 73.19 84.04 96.99 91.01 96.51 90.7 92.32 
8 Benin 2006 28.32 40.26 28.88 35.4 2.54 71.83 40.22 41.61 
9 Bhutan 2007 34.97 56.4 46.37 41.28 5.32 21.18 33.12 35.44 
10 Bolivia 2011 56.44 50.56 37.79 58.44 2.91 76.81 52.76 53.62 
11 Botswana 2012 60.07 53.5 56.45 55.16 4.95 39.77 45.21 49.05 
12 Brazil 2008 48.27 53.34 20.26 68.5 38.23 92.27 59.38 55.59 
13 Bulgaria 2010 71.76 74.41 50.21 82.83 40.81 83.13 70.59 69.36 
14 Burkina Faso 2006 16.39 50.78 32.95 36.9 3.9 71.57 40.68 41.27 
15 Burundi 2006 24.06 35.17 16.96 35.39 4.15 36.97 27.89 26.92 
16 C. Africa Rep. 2007 40.14 22.02 15.27 32.43 2.24 57.98 32.8 34.45 
17 Cambodia 2011 70.4 50.86 26.14 44.44 2.17 59.93 46.83 49.02 
18 Cameroon 2010 35.79 41.44 16.83 51.95 2.73 70.25 42.67 40.16 
19 Canada 2013 74.03 77.68 81.23 92.24 94.97 92.94 85.6 86.39 
20 Chad 2011 50.22 28.12 19.94 36.74 2.91 58.55 37.11 39.14 
21 Chile 2013 77.71 75.92 38.21 76.16 40.69 88.74 71.11 69.54 
22 China 2012 41.21 56.27 16.75 65.54 78.02 84.8 60.42 55.12 
23 Colombia 2008 54.98 42.87 30.73 70.8 38.22 78.48 56.48 54.44 
24 Congo D. Rep. 2006 19.87 28.69 8.76 34.02 1 44.96 26.11 24.95 
25 Congo Rep. 2008 91.35 37.23 31.94 40.9 1.74 39.88 42.91 47.78 
26 Costa Rica 2013 62.9 66.25 55.31 81.31 45.89 59.43 62.05 61.03 
27 Cyprus 2006 91.53 84.62 86.55 95.34 47.57 59.05 76.11 78.44 
28 Denmark 2013 84.52 80.7 81.47 88.35 93.53 91.65 86.99 88.85 
29 Dominic Rep. 2009 54.07 57.06 53.37 67.39 36.62 56.88 55 55.44 
30 Ecuador 2014 40.55 36.53 34.14 62.25 38.21 80.97 52.78 51.64 
31 Egypt 2012 41.62 46.07 22.45 66.66 35.94 93.45 56.99 53.67 
32 El Salvador 2011 57.17 63.11 35.53 66.64 41.19 78.63 60.89 59.25 
33 Ethiopia 2011 28.98 21.94 10.54 29.29 2.17 81.88 36.82 37.47 
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34 Fiji 2009 64.73 25.64 56.01 50.18 43.87 66.56 53.75 57.81 
35 Finland 2009 77.81 86.19 72.26 88.86 91.36 90.25 85.08 85.04 
36 France 2013 73.58 78.12 81.13 89.14 92.48 97.29 86.09 87.32 
37 Gabon 2011 75.77 31.78 51.97 61.25 2.36 51.11 47.92 51.79 
38 Gambia  2009 50.86 50.47 45.99 61.95 5.38 64.8 50.18 51.12 
39 Germany 2013 75.94 73.34 79.32 85.4 92.01 91.93 83.41 85.16 
40 Ghana 2008 36.37 51.83 35.82 43.8 4.52 83.98 49.19 50.64 
41 Greece 2012 61.28 77.37 75.14 84.24 84.42 91.33 79.82 80.21 
42 Guatemala 2010 46.46 68.4 27.08 56.03 43.98 82.47 58.89 56.59 
43 Guinea 2010 35.7 31.29 21.36 39.92 4.15 71.9 39.38 40.45 
44 Guyana 2013 61.74 58.98 48.79 58.06 5.76 44.66 47.6 49.78 
45 Haiti 2014 35.21 68.47 6.41 51.82 1 48.28 38.81 34.53 
46 Honduras 2010 63.36 65.1 30.16 60.23 39.72 70.29 58.38 57.05 
47 Hungary 2011 91.22 81.45 66.67 89.18 90.33 90.93 86.05 86.3 
48 Iceland 2013 89.48 59.8 80.56 78.37 50.11 54.09 67.32 71.77 
49 India 2006 35.28 43.76 13.64 46.46 32.53 89.37 50.22 47.98 
50 Indonesia 2008 49.64 69.02 17.85 47.95 33.79 84.05 56.64 54.53 
51 Ireland 2008 97.8 88.49 91.12 92.11 48.1 87.41 85.93 89.89 
52 Israel 2011 69.88 76.98 75.38 66.87 90.37 65.01 72.46 75.13 
53 Italy 2013 64.98 75.44 70.42 78.44 88.21 97.52 80.94 81.77 
54 Ivory Coast 2013 56.86 36.44 29.24 53.69 2.61 74.19 47.92 48.82 
55 Jamaica 2014 73.94 51.72 57 67.13 6.93 72.58 58.43 62.05 
56 Japan 2011 43.92 65.57 42.19 76.22 87.85 88.66 69.25 65.61 
57 Jordan 2013 72.22 61.91 52.07 69.51 42.37 86.09 67.93 69.18 
58 Kenya 2012 25.69 44.87 19.21 48.47 3.59 82.94 45.16 42.55 
59 Kuwait 2013 53.45 65.47 70.68 73.63 89.69 60.31 66.44 67.03 
60 Lebanon 2011 77.07 56.8 70.26 90.02 45.95 60.76 65.7 67.36 
61 Lesotho 2006 59.43 37.57 24.7 45.45 6.68 33.39 35.69 36.96 
62 Luxembourg 2006 99.72 87.43 96.37 96.87 48.06 60.97 80.05 83.89 
63 Madagascar 2011 56.71 28.24 8.15 49.42 2.67 63.64 39.71 39.25 
64 Malawi 2009 32.32 44.3 27.07 39.17 6.74 61.73 39.76 40.16 
65 Malaysia 2014 88.91 66.95 57.96 77.28 87.65 83.69 78.14 79.14 
66 Mali 2007 44.08 41.64 20.96 36.32 2.17 73.6 43.06 44.06 
67 Malta 2006 97.19 87.13 83.62 96.07 50.17 47.77 74.5 76.39 
68 Mauritania 2006 72.75 40.6 25.64 43.51 1.37 45.02 40.79 43.65 
69 Mauritius 2006 57.62 70.87 59.49 85.06 40.57 57.79 61.85 60.47 
70 Mexico 2008 55.23 60.32 42.67 70.3 41.09 70.95 59.27 57.99 
71 Moldova 2014 60.52 63.4 40.67 84.06 37.77 69 61.39 58.36 
72 Mongolia 2006 54.54 60.02 19.54 57.15 2.05 65.31 48.72 46.41 
73 Montenegro 2006 52.52 76.75 73.23 94.86 6.25 46.57 57.31 56.97 
74 Morocco 2006 49.22 40.66 35.46 67.4 37.2 87.73 57.63 56.51 
75 Myanmar 2009 47.2 49.84 9.82 27.94 1 36 31.86 32.04 
76 Nepal 2008 11.4 31.69 25.16 37.96 3.35 68.1 34.85 34.44 
77 Netherlands 2009 95.28 88.51 84.91 90.53 92.9 93.23 91.35 93.78 
78 New Zealand 2013 72.83 85.72 78.84 89.57 50.42 80.03 77.41 78.48 
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79 Nicaragua 2008 53.72 63.14 35.68 56.5 39.11 55.74 52.42 51.57 
80 Niger 2007 24.17 37.19 32.59 30.52 1.68 71.94 38.88 41.05 
81 Nigeria 2014 46.48 52.49 9.46 46.64 1.43 90.79 50.24 48.17 
82 Norway 2006 81.16 70.67 79.65 83.91 91.99 88.88 82.87 85.24 
83 Pakistan 2014 33.87 45.27 19.22 48.01 32.32 87.3 51.02 48.64 
84 Panama 2006 91.07 65.78 50.23 73.96 47.74 56.13 64.69 65.63 
85 Paraguay 2008 53.18 57.92 36.26 60.83 37.09 75.13 57.14 56.32 
86 Peru 2006 66.78 67.15 32.7 54.46 37.01 84.09 62.39 62.5 
87 Philippines 2014 58.47 49.32 24.22 54.23 41.28 82.83 56.84 55.98 
88 Poland 2011 72.22 68.03 56.29 91.86 87.36 89.58 78.67 76.61 
89 Portugal 2013 79.89 82.09 68.63 91.19 89.7 88.98 84.05 83.54 
90 Romania 2006 60.44 60.73 44.18 78.72 38.69 89.91 66.5 64.99 
91 Rwanda 2006 19.54 34.11 23.81 38.03 4.27 60.31 34.49 34.22 
92 Saudi Arabia 2006 52.82 76.19 70.24 69.12 82.06 57.24 65.22 66.57 
93 Senegal 2006 40.99 38.14 40.6 58.22 4.09 86.13 50.65 51.75 
94 Sierra Leone 2009 30.15 41.28 19.63 33.56 3.22 61.16 36.2 36.81 
95 Singapore 2014 99.01 96.53 93.2 85.75 96.53 54.77 83.64 87.04 
96 South Africa 2011 67.26 63.98 39.51 61.09 40.86 86.2 64.64 64.93 
97 South Korea  2006 54.55 65.58 39.06 76.1 41.38 83.59 63.92 61.36 
98 Spain 2013 75.24 74.68 73.88 86.21 89.6 95.51 83.68 84.6 
99 Swaziland 2007 63.2 36.36 61.97 54.71 6.37 33.68 42.4 47.23 
100 Sweden 2013 85.48 75.35 81.3 81.02 93.46 94.65 86.05 89.13 
101 Switzerland 2011 94.7 60.22 91.35 89.06 94.96 92.44 86.84 91.37 
102 Syria 2007 49.06 38.95 43.38 63.66 1 54.93 44.26 45.17 
103 Tanzania 2006 27.06 50.59 17.16 33.54 2.61 55.17 35.78 34.91 
104 Thailand 2008 74.06 55.41 39.67 68.67 37.94 78.48 62.87 62.95 
105 Togo 2008 53.5 37.49 28.74 54.91 3.53 71.19 46.93 47.25 
106 Trinid &Tobago 2007 79.71 71.95 61.64 66.92 5.76 47.01 56.82 59.84 
107 Tunisia 2011 68.94 42.49 40.06 78.34 2.48 83.92 58.35 58.22 
108 Turkey 2006 46.77 69.54 40.93 72.69 78.12 89.96 69.07 65.92 
109 Uganda 2006 35.99 52.16 24.19 35.24 3.53 67.77 42.31 42.8 
110 United Kingdom 2014 80.71 85.27 76.35 87.66 93.64 94.67 87.26 88.15 
111 United States 2009 59.05 78.48 66.91 81.46 91.77 91.43 79.14 78.47 
112 Uruguay 2012 60.28 67.75 52.98 69.97 42.11 84.09 66.43 66.74 
113 Venezuela 2010 40.82 37.04 38.46 70.34 40.3 66.51 50.75 48.92 
114 Vietnam 2006 70.58 39.35 17.13 59.33 3.04 50.33 43.21 42.59 
115 Yemen 2014 35.99 54.18 26.38 44.1 1.12 65.01 42.99 42.64 
116 Zambia 2012 50.36 55.83 16.51 43.66 3.78 73.04 47.36 46.41 
E1, E2, S1, S2, S3, P and KOF are for the Year-L when the overall index AEMC attained minimum (Gmin) during 
2006-2014. AEMC Indices are computed by the author. 
 
 
 
